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Abstract
Social dialogue has been challenged in some countries in the wake of the Great Recession. In particular, 
National Social Dialogue Institutions (NSDIs) have sometimes been charged with having limited effective-
ness in policymaking. This paper evaluates how and when NSDIs prove less effective than they should in 
performing their tasks, how to measure such effectiveness, and how to improve their operational capacity 
and impact. The effectiveness of social dialogue crucially depends on combinations of the problem-solving 
capacity of the NSDI, an encompassing mandate to deal with relevant socioeconomic issues and an ena-
bling environment that grants the inclusion of social dialogue into decision-making. Combining the results 
from a 2017 ILO-AICESIS survey of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions around the globe 
with the analysis of four case studies (Italy, South Korea, Brazil and Tunisia), the study shows substantial 
evidence that two sub-dimensions are key to enhance the policy effectiveness of NSDIs: enjoying political 
support and having an ‘effective mandate’ as opposed to relying on just a formal remit to deal with socio-
economic issues of interest.
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Introduction
 The post-WWII history of social dialogue, defined by the ILO as “all types of negotiation and consultation, 
and also the exchange of information between, or among, representatives of governments, employers and work-
ers on issues of common interest relating to economic and social policy”1, has recorded a number of undeni-
able successes. A robust social contract between government and the social partners underpinned eco-
nomic growth in the 1950s-60s and helped distributing the gains between labour and capital (Schmitter, 
1974). During the 1970s, social dialogue aimed to preserve employment in a time of domestic turmoil and 
increased global competition. The 1980s-1990s witnessed the emergence of social pacts, also in countries 
lacking strong social dialogue institutions (Baccaro and Galindo, 2018; Avdagić, Rhodes and Visser, 2011). 
In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis social dialogue succeeded in protecting jobs across 
the globe (Ghellab, 2009).
However, social dialogue has been seriously challenged in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008-09. The 
spread of national social dialogue institutions and increased ratification of Convention No. 144 concerning 
Tripartite Consultations (ILO, 2017a) have not always translated into positive results on the ground. Social 
dialogue has been charged with being insufficiently effective to prevent growing vulnerabilities and pre-
cariousness (Standing, 2011), increasing income inequality (ILO, 2017; OECD, 2015), the deregulation of in-
dustrial relations (Baccaro and Howell, 2017), declining collective bargaining coverage (OECD, 2017: 138), 
the forging of less ambitious social pacts compared to the past (Guardiancich and Molina, 2017; Baccaro 
and Galindo, 2018; ILO, 2018), and so on.
Indeed, one of the most pressing issues that emerged in 2018 during the 107th Session of the International 
Labour Conference was that social dialogue was perceived as not being as effective as the current circum-
stances require, as pointed out in several ILO documents, both those originating within the Office (ILO, 
2018), the Conference (ILO, 2018a) and those stemming from the comments received by the social part-
ners (ILO, 2018b). The Resolution on social dialogue and tripartism has explicitly asked for ILO’s coopera-
tion to (ILO, 2018a: 4): “enhance the effectiveness and inclusiveness of mechanisms and institutions for national 
tripartite social dialogue between governments and the social partners, including in relation to areas pertaining 
to the future of work and the SDGs [Sustainable Development Goals]”. In the context of the Covid-19 pandem-
ic, evidence shows that social dialogue has played a key role in the early stages of crisis response in many 
countries in devising timely and targeted responses to support employment and economic recovery (ILO, 
2020).Consequently, it is important to evaluate how and when do national social dialogue institutions prove 
less effective than they should in performing their task, how to measure such effectiveness, and how to 
improve their operational capacity and impact.2
The paper consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. Within the theoretical part the aim is to get a bet-
ter definition of two concepts that are often taken for granted. First, given the multiple roles played by so-
cial dialogue in the decision-making process, the need arises to isolate its precise contribution to the pro-
duction of policy that is being evaluated. Second, once the role is isolated, it is possible to individuate those 
mutually non-exclusive scope conditions that allow for the effective operation of National Social Dialogue 
Institutions (NSDIs) to take place.
Taking inspiration from the management-related literature, social dialogue effectiveness – in terms of pro-
viding the inputs and influencing the outputs of policymaking, so the ‘substantial’ rather than just the ‘pro-
cedural’ aspects of social dialogue – crucially depends on combinations of the problem-solving capacity 
of the NSDI, an encompassing mandate to deal with relevant socioeconomic issues and an enabling envi-
ronment that grants the political inclusion of social dialogue into decision-making. In order to study these 
1 See https://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm)%20%20a
2 Compatibly with the availability of data, the present analysis is limited to specific forms of social dialogue. As it is well known, in many 
countries social dialogue happens outside of the national social dialogue institutions established for that purpose. Jessop (2015) 
claims that new heterarchical governance structures have been emerging already since the 1980s, thereby including a multitude of 
new stakeholders into decision-making. Guardiancich and Molina (2017) show that there are cases where dedicated social dialogue 
fora have been set up to cope with the crisis (Germany, France), where bipartite negotiations have supplanted the breakdown of tri-
partism (Spain), and where bipartism is the norm and has not been interrupted (Sweden). 
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underlying conditions and their impact on social dialogue effectiveness, the paper follows van de Ven’s 
(1976) suggestion that the indicators of organizational assessment shall be divided into those than can be 
observed through a generalized survey and are comparable across the case studies, and those that can be 
studied through a detailed case history only. 
Consequently, the first part of the empirical analysis is based on the results of the survey of Economic and 
Social Councils and Similar Institutions (ESC-SIs),3 launched in 2017 by the ILO, in collaboration with the 
International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (AICESIS). The survey 
consists of multiple-choice questions paired with open-ended explanations4 (for the whole list of questions, 
see Appendix I) and had been sent to 86 institutions.5 The reasons for limiting the number of participants 
to the survey was either the dormant status of or the difficulty to reach out to some ESC-SIs. 45 represent-
atives of ESC-SIs responded (52.3 per cent): nine from Africa, five from the Americas and the Caribbean, 
two from the Arab States, ten from the Asia-Pacific region and 19 from Europe (for details, see Appendix 
II). Three fifths of respondents were also AICESIS members.
Even though the survey was commissioned in a different context, it contains several questions related to 
social dialogue effectiveness covered in this brief. Most important, it dedicates a number of questions to 
the SDGs (UN, 2015) and the Future of Work (FoW) initiative (ILO, 2015), the two domains in which the ILO 
(2018a) had been explicitly asked for cooperation to enhance the effectiveness of social dialogue. Given 
that the overall number of cases is too low to perform a statistical analysis of social dialogue effectiveness, 
the paper investigates correlations only.
Despite the usefulness of the survey, it can be employed just as a complement to more fine-grained ac-
counts of social dialogue in action. Hence, the second part of the empirical analysis contemplates select-
ed case studies from four global regions. Within the highly developed European context, the Consiglio 
Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (CNEL) in Italy suffers from a clear lack of mandate. In Asia, the power 
imbalances obstructed the functioning of the Korean Tripartite Commission (KTC), which has been not long 
ago relaunched as the Economic, Social and Labor Council (ESLC). In Latin America, the Brazilian Conselho 
de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (CDES) is a relevant case of political vulnerability. Finally, the Tunisian 
Groupe de Travail Tripartite du Contrat Social is included as to provide a tentative guide for emerging NSDIs, 
many of which have recently sprung up across Africa. 
3 For the sake of simplicity, the paper uses the acronyms ESC-SIs and NSDIs interchangeably.
4 As the composition of ESC-SIs varies considerably, the respondents were asked to report the unified views of the institution. Failing 
that, nuanced answers for different stakeholders were in certain cases provided.
5 From the following countries/territories: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Curaçao, Czechia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Hungary, ndonesia, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Laos, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, North Macedonia, Norway, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Panama, Papua 
New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Romania, Russian Federation, Salmon Islands, Samoa, 
Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Sint Maarten, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, 
Tunisia, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Viet-Nam
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 X 1 Theoretical framework
 
For the purpose of this paper, social dialogue is conceived as a system of policymaking, rather than a struc-
ture of interest representation.6 This implies that, regardless of their undoubtful and growing importance, 
the present policy brief does not deal with issues of inclusiveness (which actors are represented) and repre-
sentativeness (do the actors included in social dialogue fairly reflect the underlying categories of workers, 
employers, civil society, etc.), i.e. the so-called ‘input legitimacy’ of social dialogue. Nor it looks at ‘through-
put legitimacy’, i.e. the democratic quality of consultation and participation processes (Schmidt, 2013), but 
focuses instead on the effectiveness of NSDIs’ involvement in policymaking, its so-called ‘output legitima-
cy’ (Scharpf, 2003).7
Within the management-related literature, according to van de Ven (1976: 74), effectiveness (one of the per-
formance indicators for an organization) is defined as “the extent to which organizational goals are attained. 
A tangible goal normally specifies a desired level of change in organizational input, transformation, and output 
within a certain time period. […] The extent or percentage of goal attainment at the end of the operating period, 
then, is the measure of effectiveness.”
To this end the Socio-economic Council of the Netherlands (Sociaal-Economische Raad) has defined three 
dimensions of effectiveness (SER, 2018). The one most closely associated to ‘output legitimacy’ is instru-
mental or policy effectiveness, where the institution’s opinions and recommendations have to be trans-
lated into public policies. The second one is agenda effectiveness, which refers to the impact that social 
dialogue may have on setting the political and public policy agenda. This could happen through several 
mechanisms, including the publication of research or policy reports, the development of awareness rais-
ing campaigns etc. In this way, notwithstanding the limited policy power most social dialogue institutions 
have, there are grater possibilities to influence the public opinion, political parties and ultimately policy-
makers about a certain matter. 
The third dimension of effectiveness refers to the capacity that social partners or NSDIs have to analyse a 
certain policy issue or problem and make policy recommendations or indicate potential avenues to reach 
specific policy goals. Analytical effectiveness is accordingly the capacity of NSDIs and the social partners to 
provide a public good, which consists in their ability to develop rigorous, independent and up-to-date anal-
yses around any social problem. These provide members and stakeholders with the necessary knowledge 
in order to assess and tackle a certain socio-economic problem. Both agenda and analytical effectiveness 
play an important role in the policymaking process as they generate inputs for policy formulation, there-
fore contributing to overall policy effectiveness. 
6 Such dual nature of corporatist regimes was long debated in the vast literature on neo-corporatism (see, among others, Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch, 1982; Molina and Rhodes, 2002; Baccaro, 2003). For example, Cawson (1986: 38) defines corporatism as a specific 
socio-political process in which organizations representing monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange with state 
agencies over public policy outputs which involves those organizations in a role which combines interest representation and policy 
implementation through delegated self-enforcement.
7 The ILO (2013) itself proposes four macro conditions for successful national (tripartite) social dialogue: democratic foundations and 
freedom of association; strong, legitimate, independent and representative workers’ and employers’ organizations; political will, a 
sense of responsibility and commitment of all parties to engage in social dialogue; appropriate institutional support. Freedom of as-
sociation and the existence of strong social partners are not being discussed in this brief.
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Hence, the contribution strives to individuate two fundamental characteristics of social dialogue that un-
derpin its performance or lack thereof. First, it pinpoints the policymaking role of social dialogue for which 
effectiveness is assessed. Second, it singles out the scope conditions for social dialogue to be effective.
1.1  The role of social dialogue
Despite the existence of several caveats, the article refers to the simplified policy cycle model of policymak-
ing, first defined as a series of steps – agenda-setting, policy formulation, decision-making, policy imple-
mentation and evaluation – by Harold Lasswell in the 1950s (Howell and Giest, 2012: 17). Ideally, social di-
alogue should be present at each of the steps of the policy cycle, as underscored in ILO’s definition, which 
gives the whole policymaking process the already mentioned ‘thoughput legitimacy’. 
The government, together with the social partners shall set the agenda – individuate the problems and a 
range of solutions – with respect to those labour and social policies that are the domain of social dialogue 
(its implicit or explicit mandate). With help of the problem-solving and analytical capacity of the social part-
ners, the government should then narrow down the policy options/solutions by eliminating the unfeasible 
or undesirable ones. Negotiations between the government and the social partners over which aspects of 
these policy solutions to adopt and which to discard (part of the so-called political exchange) should take 
place during policy formulation and/or during decision-making, leading to the adoption by government 
of a particular course of action, i.e. the policy output. This bulk of laws, decrees, regulations etc. becomes 
then executive and is implemented using some combination of the tools of public administration. In des-
ignated sectors, the social partners should play a role, warranting that the implementation reflects their 
desired distribution of goods and services in society. The policy outcomes and their impact on the targets 
of regulation thus obtained are then evaluated. The social partners should be informed and consulted on 
the results of such exercise, thereby leading to the reconceptualization of policy problems and solutions in 
the light of the gathered experience.
Parts of the policy cycle, where high levels of social dialogue activity take place, that is, where there is con-
tinuous interaction between the government and the social partners, are of interest for the paper. To be 
more precise, it focuses on those instances of social dialogue, where the social partners together with the 
government provide policy inputs during policy formulation, in order to make a tangible impact on the pol-
icy outputs, determined through decision-making. 
Examples of the important policy role played by social dialogue in all phases of the policymaking process 
are the role it has played in countries experiencing transitions to democracy and in tackling income ine-
qualities. Historically, social dialogue and tripartism have played a particularly important role in democratic 
transitions (Croucher and Wood, 2015). This irrespective of the economic system where the transition took 
place, as the comparative analysis of transitions to democracy in Poland and Spain showed (Meardi et al., 
2015), or also those in South America and emerging economies (Collier and Collier, 1991; Hayter and Lee, 
2018). These authors show that tripartite social dialogue had a ‘foundational’ function in stabilizing both 
political and economic transitions. Moreover, even when it became only poorly institutionalized, it none-
theless contributed to consolidate a pattern of sporadic tripartite social dialogue and policy concertation 
with a beneficial impact on the political climate.
Another important role played by social dialogue is the reduction in income inequalities. There is significant 
evidence showing a relationship between certain social dialogue and collective bargaining institutions as 
well as practice and lower income inequalities (Vaughan-Whitehead, 2017). Collective bargaining coverage, 
the degree of centralization or coordination of collective bargaining together with union density levels have 
been pointed out as those dimensions of industrial relations systems with a stronger role in reducing dis-
parities (Keune, 2015; Hayter, 2011). But there are other indirect mechanisms, whereby social dialogue can 
affect income inequalities, including the fixing of minimum wages, or the negotiation of labour market and 
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welfare state reforms. Negotiated reforms reflect a balance between the interests of employers, workers 
and governments, and will accordingly tend to protect the interests of a majority of the working population. 
1.2  Conditions for effectiveness 
By focussing on the role of social dialogue within the process of transforming policy inputs (through ne-
gotiation, consultation and information sharing) into policy outputs (government decisions aimed at im-
proving socioeconomic policy), it is now possible to individuate those scope conditions that allow social di-
alogue to be effective.8
An obvious starting point is to attain at the classical management literature that strives to measure organ-
izational performance. For example, Lusthaus et al. (2002) posit that organizational performance is the re-
sult of the interaction of three fundamental characteristics: i) the organizational capacity, measured through 
its leadership, structure, resources, etc.; ii) the organizational motivation, which depends on its historical 
role, its mission, and so on; iii) the surrounding environment – political, administrative, socio-cultural, etc. 
Even though these characteristics cannot be treated as conditions for success, they are mutually reinforc-
ing: when the three are aligned – i.e. when the organization has sufficient capacity, it is motivated, and it 
operates in an enabling environment – then it is plausible to expect positive results on one or more per-
formance indicators.
Such, albeit modified scheme can be then applied to social dialogue institutions in order to determine when 
these have a greater probability of being effective. The departing point is to be found in the twin literatures 
on the power resources theory of trade unions (Schmalz and Dörre, 2017) and on the political economy of 
corporatism (Molina and Rhodes, 2002).   
Siaroff (1999), for example, individuates the following characteristics of functioning corporatism: i) struc-
tural features (characteristics of workers’ and employers’ organizations, internal operations, etc.), which 
determine the organizational capacity of the actors involved; ii) functional roles of represented interests in 
the decision-making process that largely influence the organizational motivation of actors; iii) behavioural 
patterns in policymaking, such as the importance of political exchange for consensus-building, and iv) fa-
vourable contexts, be they political, historical, economic, and so on. 
With regards to the organizational capacity of social dialogue to actively participate in policy formulation 
with the aim of providing meaningful inputs to the policymaking process, then NSDIs have to be proficient 
in problem-solving. As Culpepper and Regan (2014) or Regalia and Regini (2018) neatly show for unions, 
governments take into consideration those interlocutors that can either threaten government stability 
(through, e.g., their mobilization capacity) or provide useful problem-solving ability. 
The problem-solving capacity has at least two sub-dimensions that need to be disentangled. First, social di-
alogue institutions are more easily integrated into the process if they have the resources (human, financial 
and technical) to be proficient problem solvers. Well-endowed institutions, such as the Sociaal-Economische 
Raad, which employs some 100 staff and has a multi-million Euro budget, play a fundamental role in provid-
ing policy input to policymakers. Second, there must be a balance of power between employers and work-
ers and government, including as regards the composition of individual NSDIs (for an extensive discussion 
8 It is important to stress that the conditions detailed here are more exacting and related to the policymaking process than those sug-
gested by the ILO (2013) in its guide on national tripartite social dialogue. 
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on minimum wage fixing machineries, see Guardiancich and Artale, 2018).9 This condition ensures that the 
decisions taken within the social dialogue institution are not systematically biased in favour of one or the 
other group that is represented. In the case of Korea and South Africa, the imbalances of power between 
labour and business went hand in hand with the diminishing role of the Korean Tripartite Commission 
(KTC) and the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) (Kim and Westhuizen, 2018).
As for organizational motivation, it is most useful to enquire whether social dialogue plays a mandated (for-
mal or informal) role in policymaking, which implies having negotiating, consultative and/or information 
rights in a number of policy domains. The concept that types of institutionalization of corporatist systems 
give different access to policymaking to the social partners had been developed by Treu (1992), where, of 
course, the higher the integration in the decision-making process the greater the real influence over the 
design of policy output. 
It is important to note, however, that few NSDIs have direct negotiating power. With respect, for instance, 
to minimum wage fixing, Eyraud and Saget (2005), show that the ratio of social dialogue institutions that 
provide non-binding opinions to institutions that make decisions is approximately five to one on a global 
basis. What seems more important is, whether a social dialogue institution has the ‘effective mandate’ to 
consult and/or negotiate over a specific socioeconomic issue or not. For example, in the case of European 
social dialogue, one major complaint is that the topics currently addressed are rather marginal to the em-
ployment and social policy agendas (Prosser and Perin, 2015). 
As for the surrounding environment, there are at least three aspects worth exploring. First, Guardiancich 
and Molina (2017) have noted that a necessary condition for social dialogue to function is that there is a 
political will to de facto include it in the policymaking process. As it has been very clear from the outset of 
the crisis, whatever institutional arrangement is in place, governmental unilateralism is always a fall-back 
option (Culpepper, 2014; Ghellab and Papadakis, 2011). Moreover, according to keen observers of public 
policymaking (see Richardson, 2018), there has been a generalized trend that deliberative and consensu-
al policymaking styles have been gradually replaced by freneticism and imposition in decision-making. An 
institution that has been gradually politically side-lined is the CNEL in Italy. Despite its endowments allow-
ing for proficient problem-solving and its constitutionally sanctioned status, it was long shunned by the 
social partners and ultimately threatened with elimination in late 2016. A case of political disfavour is the 
Brazilian CDES, which was dissolved in the early days of 2019. 
Second, under conditions of economic crisis or financial stress, often decision-makers have accused social 
dialogue institutions of not being fast or conclusive enough to produce incisive policy solutions. This was 
precisely the case for the challenges that the Consejo Económico y Social (CES) underwent in Spain. According 
to Molina and Miguélez (2017), during the crisis, in several Autonomous Communities, these Councils were 
suppressed as part of fiscal consolidation by virtue of their supposedly limited impact on policy. At the same 
time, the frequent recourse to emergency procedures for adopting legislation massively curtailed CES’s na-
tional policymaking role. 
Third, the mutual trust between the social partners is a condition sine qua non for social dialogue, not only 
in NSDIs, to function correctly and play a constructive role in the policymaking process. If one of the tripar-
tite partners prevails, or coalesces with a second one against the third, it is reasonable to expect a deteri-
oration of relations between the partners and, hence, much lower legitimacy of the resolutions obtained 
through social dialogue. There are several examples worth mentioning. During the sovereign debt crisis, 
9 It has to be stressed that the literature on social pacts and corporatism assigns different weights to the tripartite social partners. 
While older corporatist literature focused almost exclusively on the centralization and coordination of unions, authors such as Hall 
and Soskice (2001) and Thelen (2002) posit that the capacity of coordination and willingness to participate in social dialogue of em-
ployers is key. Avdagić (2011) argues that the ample use of social dialogue in the 1990s was conditional on having weak or minority 
governments relying on the social partners for their legitimacy. 
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which ravaged the Eurozone between 2009 and 2013, the Slovenian government led separate negotiations 
and granted separate concessions to employers and workers. These soured relations between the social 
partners and forced the employer organizations to boycott tripartite social dialogue at the Ekonomski in 
Socialni Svet (ESS) in Slovenia, after more than 15 years of uninterrupted functioning (Guardiancich, 2017). 
Again, during the crisis, the Irish conservative government of Fianna Fáil emasculated social dialogue af-
ter portraying the unions as a public-sector interest group, lobbying government in defence of ‘overpaid 
bureaucrats’ and ‘labor market insiders’ (Culpepper and Regan, 2014). In the early 2000s, in Italy, after a 
period of uninterrupted social pacts, both the newly instated centre-right government as well as the major 
employer organization Confindustria deemed national peak negotiations as less useful in the past, leading 
to a progressive abandonment of social pacting (Baccaro and Howell, 2017). 
The three mutually reinforcing characteristics, as shown in Figure 1, are: 
i) the capacity of NSDIs to solve problems, i.e. its organizational or problem-solving capacity:
a) availability of human, financial and technical resources;
b) balance of power between workers and employers;
ii) an implicit or explicit, that is, ‘effective mandate’ to deal with a number of social and economic issues 
that are of interest to the social partners, reflecting the organizational motivation in social dialogue; 
iii) the acceptance of social dialogue as part of the policymaking process, that is, the existence of an ena-
bling external environment:
a) political will and government support;
b) results of social dialogue seen as far-reaching and rapid;
c) mutual trust between the social partners.
 X Figure 1 Enabling conditions for effective social dialogue
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 X 2 Quantitative survey
 
2.1  Inclusion in policymaking
One of the key questions (Q6) administered through the ILO-AICESIS survey in 2017 tried to assess the in-
clusion of the NSDI in policymaking during the difficult post-crisis period. Almost two-thirds of NSDIs (65 
per cent) acknowledged that social dialogue had been politically challenged since the global economic and 
financial crisis hit a decade ago. Breaking down the answer according to the three sub-dimensions, the re-
sults were as follows: i) 69 per cent of respondents (20/29) found that the solutions obtained through so-
cial dialogue were deemed as insufficiently far-reaching or rapid; ii) lack of mutual trust between the social 
partners and lack of political will and/or government support obtained similar evaluations, as 35-39 per cent 
of respondents stated they were highly relevant and a further 32 per cent somewhat relevant. 
Individual NSDIs faced combinations of the three obstacles during the crisis. For instance, when the Greek 
Economic and Social Council (OKE) continued issuing opinions on most socioeconomic matters, in several 
cases the Parliament, under external pressure, adopted draft laws without paying due attention. In Belgium, 
the decision-making tempo of social dialogue was often deemed too slow to meet the government’s re-
quirements. Lack of trust between the tripartite actors was further exacerbated by the absence of political 
will to sustain social dialogue (e.g. in Republika Srpska (BiH)). Internal disagreements within the trade un-
ions and employers’ organizations, in the Netherlands, or between them, for example on fiscal issues in 
Luxembourg, rendered cooperation difficult.
2.2 Problem-solving capacity
The questions in the survey that addressed an institution’s problem-solving capacity referred to the chal-
lenges befalling the NSDIs. Q7 addressed the internal challenges, such as the lack of resources and lack of 
knowledge within an institution. Q5 and Q14, instead, explored the possible imbalance of power between 
the social partners sitting in the NSDIs.
With regards to the internal challenges, among the two dimensions related to resources: general lack of 
human, technical and financial resources; and lack of capacity and/or knowledge of the members and sec-
retariat, the first one was deemed as the most important. Fully 73 per cent of the responding NSDIs (30/41) 
lamented that lack of resources was detrimental to their correct functioning (13 saw it as a crucial issue). Not 
surprisingly, predominantly higher-income countries such as Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Singapore, Spain, etc. did not report resource-related problems. With regards to knowledge gaps, instead, 
just 37.5 per cent of NSDIs (15/40) deemed this to be a relevant problem (only three a highly relevant one). 
As for potential imbalances in the power of the social partners, regrettably, neither set of answers satisfac-
torily presents the situation in individual NSDIs. The responses to Q5 showed only minimal differences in 
the participation of worker and employer organizations in social dialogue. As many as 29 worker and 27 
employer organizations, respectively, displayed medium to high levels of activity. Occasional or no involve-
ment in social dialogue was rare, as only three labour and five employer organizations seemed to be only 
scarcely engaged. In terms of participation, there appeared to be fair balances of power. Of the 42 NSDIs 
that fully responded to the question, just six reported an imbalance in the participation: in five cases em-
ployer representatives were less engaged than the employee ones. 
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Similarly, the wording of one of the answers to Q14, i.e. that Changes in the trade union density and employ-
er organization membership base are shaping national social dialogue, does not provide additional infor-
mation on eventual imbalances. Yet, experience as well as the answers tell a different story: a majority of 
respondents (23/42) deemed these changes to be relevant (or highly relevant) for the future of domestic 
social dialogue, most probably meaning that changes in the composition of social partners’ memberships 
was unsettling, or soon may be, the balance of power between employers and employees.
2.3  Encompassing mandate
A number of survey questions addressed the issue of whether the institutions’ mandate was sufficiently 
broad to deal with socioeconomic issues relevant to the social partners. One was generic (Q7) and three 
(Q4, Q4ter and Q9) dealt explicitly with SDGs and the FoW initiative. 
As for a general lack of mandate, this did not seem to matter to 72.5 per cent of the answering NSDIs 
(29/40). Seven found it relevant and only four highly important. Of these, a salient case is the Italian CNEL, 
where, despite its constitutionally sanctioned nature, the institution seems not to find a proper role in de-
cision-making.
With regards to the individual initiatives, NSDIs are engaged in the FoW initiative more than in the SDGs. 
Whereas almost 75 per cent of respondents (32/43) declared that they had a mandate to deal with FoW-
related issues, only 56 per cent of respondents (24/43) answered that they had discussed SDGs.10 Of the 19 
institutions that did not discuss SDGs, six did not have the mandate, six did not have sufficient information 
(hence, inadequate problem-solving capacity) and six planned to do so in the near future.
With regards to FoW-related initiatives, Q9 bis asked NSDIs to self-evaluate their participation in the policy-
making process, ranging from no role (0) to being very active (3). 
The respondents had to assess three possible modes of participation: having an advisory role in drafting 
legislation and developing policies (average 1.71); being primarily involved in information-sharing, includ-
ing sharing good practices (average 1.56); having the mandate to negotiate (average 1.19). Unsurprisingly, 
negotiation rights were the least widespread. Finally, a composite variable on ‘effective mandate’ was de-
rived by averaging the sum of the three. 
2.4  The effectiveness of NSDIs
The survey makes it possible to study the effectiveness of NSDIs from two different viewpoints. First, a 
number of questions asked whether NSDIs have been involved in the discussion of policy inputs and in 
the preparation of policy outputs related to the SDGs (Q4bis) and each of the four ‘mega-drivers of change’ 
– technological advancement, climate change, demographic shifts and accelerating globalization – impact-
ing on the world of work (Q10, Q11, Q12, Q13). 
10 The greater involvement with the FoW initiative may boil down to its encompassing and less prescriptive nature. In fact, a variety of 
aspects of the changing world of work, such as demographics and globalization, had been on the agenda of several NSDIs for dec-
ades.
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As every scholar dealing with policymaking knows, the demarcation line between policy inputs and out-
puts can be blurred. In fact, the survey presented the NSDIs with a number of answers to choose from that 
could be either attributed to the inputs (preparation of a strategy, formulation of opinions and recommen-
dations, provision of policy advice, etc.) or to the outputs (development of a program of activities, definition 
of a methodology to monitor implementation, capacity building, and so on).
In practice, the results for both SDGs and FoW-related matters are not entirely satisfactory. With regards 
to the Sustainable Development Goals, of the 24 NSDIs that discussed them, 13 prepared a strategy to im-
plement the SDGs, 12 formulated opinions and recommendations, nine developed a program of activities 
(for example, training, awareness rising, etc.) and seven defined a methodology to monitor progress and 
achievements (e.g. by designing a national statistical information system).
As for FoW-related issues, the survey reveals generalized low involvement, with great variance among in-
dividual countries. Table 1 shows that: i) tasks that have been for long on the agenda (demography and 
globalization) received greater attention than newer, more salient issues (technology and climate); ii) activ-
ities leading to the formulation of policy inputs (research, various initiatives and collaborations) took prior-
ity before the production of policy outputs (capacity building, development of an action plan, and so on). 
Most probably, both trends contributed to the general sentiment that NSDIs were not effective enough.
 X Table 1 Engagement of NSDIs in FoW-related issues
Climate Technology Demography Globalization Total
Conduct research 1.02 0.76 1.27 1.11 1.04
Provide policy advice 0.93 0.62 1.27 1.13 0.99
Awareness rising 0.93 0.64 1.24 1.04 0.97
Initiatives at regional, nation-
al and global level
1.16 1.02 1.51 1.31 1.25
Capacity building 0.67 0.58 0.93 0.71 0.72
Collaboration with relevant 
institutions
1.16 0.78 1.38 1.11 1.11
Develop action plan 0.71 0.40 0.91 0.78 0.70
Total 0.94 0.69 1.22 1.03 0.97
Notes: Average engagement of the 45 respondents, where 0 = None; 1 = Low; 2 = Active; 3 = Very active 
One important finding is that effectiveness seems to be either present or not in different social dialogue 
institutions. According to the answers to the survey, those NSDIs that discussed SDGs were also relative-
ly more active in multiple FoW-related interventions, especially in demography and globalization. Hence, 
countries dealing with SDGs and/or one or more FoW-related item tend to deal with the others as well and 
vice-versa. Furthermore, established issues, in particular, population ageing and the spread of global sup-
ply chains, command greater attention than newer ones, such as the implications for the world of work of 
the fourth industrial revolution and of anthropogenic climate change.  
2.5  Hypotheses for variation
There are several hypotheses on the differential effectiveness of NSDIs that can be derived from the sur-
vey. They relate to whether social dialogue institutions: i) take part in decision-making; ii) have the ability 
to solve problems; iii) are endowed with an adequate mandate.
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First, with regards to the variables indicating the inclusion in policymaking, those countries that have ex-
perienced recent challenges to social dialogue have also been less active in FoW-related actions, especially 
in climate change. Second, the existence of resource limitations or knowledge gaps are pervasive, yet, they 
seem to only limitedly affect the effectiveness of NSDIs. This may be related to the different roles played 
by NSDIs, which in certain cases can be extremely powerful without having own resources or even a firm 
legal basis. For example, the Slovenian ESS has limited financial endowments (yet, the social partners are 
themselves well resourced) and is based on a collective agreement without being enshrined in law. Third, 
as shown above, it is possible to measure the ‘effective mandate’ of an NSDI. It comes as unsurprising that 
the institutions, which reported having competences in FoW-related issues also have enacted a relatively 
higher number of FoW-related actions.
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 X 3 Case study analysis
 
3.1  When a lack of mandate trumps available resources: The 
Italian CNEL
The CNEL was instituted through Art. 99 of the Italian Constitution in 1946 as an auxiliary body of Government 
and regulated by law in 1957. Art. 99 recites:
“The National Council for Economics and Labour is composed, as set out by law, of experts and representatives of the economic 
categories, in such a proportion as to take account of their numerical and qualitative importance. It serves as a consultative body 
for the Houses and the Government for those matters and those functions attributed to it by law. It can initiate legislation and 
may contribute to drafting economic and social legislation according to the principles and within the limitations laid out by law.”
Hence, it is a bipartite-plus NSDI, consisting of representatives of labour (22), businesses (17), the self-em-
ployed and professions (9) as well as the third sector (6). The 65-strong staff also includes ten experts and 
the President.11 The Constitution endowed it with a research function, a consultative role and a negotiating 
task, limited to legislative initiative. Yet, subsequent implementation limited CNEL’s powers, in particular, 
mandatory consultation disappeared, the appointment of the President was delegated to the Government, 
meetings became closed to the public and its financial autonomy was reduced.12 
Despite a relatively positive start, the 1960s economic boom helped the development of strong social 
partners – especially the three union confederations, divided along ideological lines – the Italian General 
Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the Confederation of Trade Unions in Italy (CISL) and the Italian Federation 
of Trade Unions (UIL) – that started to circumvent the CNEL in negotiating  with the Government. Despite a 
number of attempts at CNEL’s revival, the situation did not change. In fact, the successful social pacts of the 
1990s were negotiated outside of its institution’s premises. As detailed in several accounts, e.g. in Baccaro 
and Howell (2017) and Culpepper (2014), the gradual detachment of governmental action from any form of 
concertation with the social partners that started with the centre-right governments in the early 2000s and 
continued with centre-left ones in the 2010s, culminated with the proposal of abolishing the CNEL through 
a constitutional referendum to be held on 4 December 2016.
The CNEL was accused of several mishaps. In particular, a fundamental lack of mandate severely hindered 
its capacity of generating policy inputs (since the 1970s it did not play the role of proper social dialogue insti-
tution for the social partners) and of influencing policy outputs (its legislative initiatives have not produced 
concrete laws). Moreover, a generalized public disinclination towards excessive spending elevated the CNEL 
– despite the relatively small budget and a reduction in the number of its members from 121 to 64 since 
2012 – to scapegoat for the profligate use of public funds (Rizzo and Stella, 2013). A partial endorsement 
of its functions was instead provided in the so-called ‘Document of 56 constitutional lawyers’, according to 
which the CNEL should not be abolished, but rather re-proposed as an intermediary institution between the 
political authorities and the social partners (Ferrero, 2016). Ultimately, the 2016 referendum failed, thereby 
triggering an ongoing redefinition of the institution’s role. This started as a legislative initiative for self-re-
form in February 2017 and is currently continuing under the Presidency, since May 2017, of former Labor 
Minister Tiziano Treu, also upon request of the three Italian union confederations.  
11 During the height of the sovereign debt crisis, the ‘Save Italy’ decree, legislated under the technocratic Monti government in late 
2011, slashed the number of CNEL members from 121 to 64.
12 See https://www.cnel.it/Chi-Siamo/La-Storia
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The main lesson for the effectiveness of social dialogue is that even a constitutionally sanctioned institu-
tion that has at disposal both resources and knowledge and that could, in theory, rely on powerful and 
relatively balanced social partners, suffers in the absence of a strong ‘effective mandate’ to participate in 
policymaking. The supposed low effectiveness that derives from such state of affairs negatively affects the 
public support for and political willingness to maintain such institution.
3.2 Power imbalances that matter: The Korean ESLC
The Korea Tripartite Commission (KTC) was established in January 1998 as a presidential advisory body with 
the purpose of staving off the consequences of the 1997-98 financial crisis and respond to the requests of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) attached to its financial assistance programme. The employers and 
employees, under the leadership of President Kim Dae Jung, soon agreed on a social compact, dubbed 
‘the Great Compromise’.
The establishment of the KTC marked a rupture in Korean industrial relations and the underlying neoliber-
al economic philosophy, thereby espousing for the first time ‘democratic corporatism’ and less adversarial 
labour relations. The crisis, governmental weakness vis-à-vis the IMF and the understanding by employers 
that social dialogue could help them flexibilize the labour market in exchange for chaebol reform were key 
drivers for venturing into social dialogue. The initial successes, however, were not to be repeated in full. As 
chronicled by Kim and Ahn (2018) and Kim and Westhuizen (2018), the relations between the government 
and the KTC were fraught with tensions from the beginning as the former soon resorted to unilateralism 
for a number of reforms. This angered both the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) and especial-
ly the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), which intermittently boycotted the KTC. The Korean 
Employers Federation (KEF) sometimes also withdrew its participation, in protest against concessions to labour.
An additional blow to the effectiveness of the KTC was that, once the sense of crisis had passed, Korean 
industrial relations reverted back to the default position, where the imbalance of power grants greater 
bargaining power to employers than employees. Such imbalance is further exacerbated by three charac-
teristics of Korean society (Kim and Ahn, 2018: 14): the support given to employers through a special re-
lationship of chaebols with government, a divided labour movement (sometimes disputes between KCTU 
and FKTU occur), and weak political representation of labour. For these reasons, save for the immediate 
aftermath of the financial crisis, in no period was there an equilibrium between the powers of employees 
and employers. Finally, the relatively late Korean democratization and a policymaking culture that is in-
clined towards neoliberalism meant that government and labour held radically differing views of the role 
of social dialogue in Korean industrial relations, especially during the two governments expressed by the 
Conservative Party between 2008 and 2016.
The result of these disputes was that the effectiveness of the KTC was often questioned by the very par-
ticipants to social dialogue. Of the multitude of tripartite agreements signed (166, as documented in the 
ILO-AICESIS survey), many did not sufficiently reflect the preferences of the employees or were not fully 
implemented (Kim and Ahn, 2018).
As a consequence of scarce effectiveness, a profound redefinition of social dialogue’s role is now underway 
in Korea. The twin wins of the Liberal Party in the general and presidential elections, respectively, in 2016 
and 2017, marked a turn towards labour-friendly growth under President Moon Jae-In. One firm item on 
the agenda was the rekindling of Korean tripartism. With the help of the ILO and AICESIS, the FKTU, KTCU, 
KEF and the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) agreed to resume social dialogue. As de-
tailed in the ILO-AICESIS survey, the new NSDI shall undergo changes in the discussion agenda (focussing 
on training for the skilled workforce, the platform economy, coverage and role of social safety nets, etc.), 
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in its role (aiming at forging social agreements to respond to the challenges of a changing world of work), 
in its composition and participation (diverse stakeholders representing non-regular and temporary work-
ers, and so on).
Consequently, in June 2018, the new Economic, Social and Labour Council (ESLC) was established, thereby 
substituting the Economic and Social Development Commission (ESDC). It is an NSDI with a strong com-
mitment to decent work and reduced social polarization, which extends participation to youth, women, 
atypical workers, small and medium enterprises, etc.13
The main lesson from the Korean case is that, independently from the resources or mandate, sustaining 
effective social dialogue is difficult when the problem-solving capacity of a dedicated institution is impaired 
due to the power imbalances between the social partners. These can be then partly or entirely reduced 
through political commitment to concertation. 
3.3 The importance of political support: The Brazilian CDES
Despite not being part of the ILO-AICESIS survey, the Brazilian CDES is an illustrative example of the impor-
tance of political support as a condition to continuing social dialogue.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Workers’ Party (PT) took office in January 2003, thereby marking 
a potential shift in state-society relations in Brazil from state corporatism to neo-corporatist arrangements 
favouring good governance. One of the cornerstones of such shift was the establishment of the Conselho de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (CDES) shaped in the guise of European neo-corporatist arrangements, 
especially of the Dutch SER. According to Doctor (2007: 137), although the CDES did not have SER’s super-
visory powers, it emulated it by performing important advisory functions, reporting directly to the execu-
tive and by being strongly committed to ensuring sustainable economic development, equitable income 
distribution, and national competitiveness. The Spanish and Portuguese experiences with neo-corporat-
ism were also taken as example of relatively late but successful democratization through social dialogue.
In addition to the President of the Republic and 11 government representatives, the tripartite-plus body 
had an unequal distribution of members between business (41), labour unions (13), social movements (11), 
independent experts (10), class organizations (3), cultural associations (2), religious groups (2) as well as 
Northern and Northeastern regions (7) (Diniz, 2011). 
A number of weaknesses reduced the CDES effectiveness, especially in influencing policy output (Doctor, 
2007: 143): a clear preponderance of representatives of individual businesses, little attention to the poor-
er northern and northeastern regions of the country, excessively large size, infrequent meetings leading 
to debate on specific issues only and not to the general evaluation of the policy environment, dependence 
on the executive and lack of autonomy, a subordinate status of the executive to Congress, an institution 
jealous of its exclusive legislative decision-making powers. All these characteristics point to a decisive lack 
of ‘effective mandate’ for the CDES, and a power imbalance in its composition. Yet, the CDES represented 
an important institutional innovation, favouring greater societal participation in the policy formulation pro-
cess. As illustration, the Unified Workers' Central (CUT) considered the institution as key for the elaboration 
of a common agenda to face the consequences of the 2008 global crisis (Mosoetsa and Williams, 2012). 
13 One noteworthy operational rule adopted by the ESLC is that its Plenary Committee decisions on the agenda require two-third ma-
jorities on condition that at least half of the representatives of labour, management and government are present (similar to the 
Minimum Wage Council, as detailed in Guardiancich and Artale, 2018). 
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The most important weakness, however, was the disinterest among political elites (parties other than the 
PT and state governors) for the activities of the CDES, which rather than hampering its short-term opera-
tions represented a threat to its long-term survival. Doctor’s (2017) intuition was quite prophetic. In recent 
years, a long recession negatively impacted the economy and the social climate in Brazil, whose political 
instability was exacerbated by the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff. The 2018 Presidential 
elections witnessed the victory of Jair Bolsonaro of the Social Liberal Party (PSL). One of the first moves of 
the new government was the abolition of the CDES in January 2019. The ‘swinging pendulum’ of Brazilian 
politics has had a negative impact on the institutional continuity of industrial relations, including the CDES 
(Berg and Schneider, 2018)
Hence, the Brazilian experience with CDES, especially if compared to that of Korea, provides us with a key 
lesson. Social dialogue institutions – even if lacking an adequate mandate or a balanced composition – have 
to be given sufficient time and political support to adapt and evolve in countries where a social dialogue 
tradition is absent. Political backing is, hence, the most crucial variable to enable a social dialogue to thrive 
and eventually produce effective policy results.
3.4 Creation of an NSDI: the Conseil National du Dialogue Social 
(CNDS) in Tunisia 
Tunisia is part of what Carothes (2002) calls the seventh democratic wave during the past half century, i.e. 
a liberalizing trend in some Middle Eastern countries that started in the mid-1990s and erupted with the 
Arab Spring 15 years later.
During and after the upheavals, Tunisia became an outlier in the Arab world, as social dialogue and the 
social partners played a determinant role in building a process of peaceful democratic transition since the 
2011 revolution. The National Dialogue Quartet, consisting of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), 
the Tunisian Union of Industry Commerce and Handicrafts (UTICA), the Tunisian National Bar Association, 
and the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015 for 
its role in building a peaceful transition, meaning that beyond procedural matters social dialogue has been 
successful in Tunisia on substantive issues as well (De Koster, 2015).
With the support of the ILO, the Government, UGTT and UTICA signed in January 2013 a ‘Social contract’. 
One of its five priorities foresaw the institution of the CNDS. Yet due to political and economic crises, es-
tablishing it proved to be a lengthy process that required several negotiation rounds: only in July 2017, the 
law establishing the CNDS was promulgated, followed, in August 2018, by the decrees on its financing, op-
erations and composition (Marzouk, 2018).
In light of the enabling conditions for effective social dialogue, the external environment seems rather fa-
vourable. Despite the long gestation, there seems to be a modicum of both political support for the CNDS 
and mutual trust between the social partners that participated to its creation. Until the operations start 
within the ordinary policymaking cycle, little can be said on the rapidity and incisiveness of the institution 
in terms of policy inputs and outputs.
As regards the mandate, the CNDS has a large remit. It is responsible for continuous and regular tripartite 
social dialogue on national, regional or sectoral socioeconomic issues of interest. It has supervision capac-
ity on compliance with social legislation and collective bargaining. It expresses opinions on socioeconomic 
projects presented by Government, on the evolution of minimum wages, on the ratification of internation-
al conventions on labour standards, etc. It proposes mechanisms likely to prevent collective conflicts and 
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helps companies in the management of industrial relations and labour disputes. It furthermore carries out 
research on matters of competence. As for its ‘effective mandate’, the Council must be compulsorily con-
sulted on laws and decrees relating to work, industrial relations, vocational training and social protection; 
optionally on other socioeconomic matters, economic and social development plans and budgets. Its opin-
ion is transmitted to the Government within one month, annexed to laws and submitted to Parliament. 
The CNSD may, of its own motion, take up matters of labour and industrial relations and submit proposals 
to the relevant parties.
Relative to the problem-solving capacity of the CNDS, its composition reflects well the tripartite partners: 35 
members from the most representative union, 35 from government (most ministries, social security funds, 
etc. are present), 30 representatives of the major employer organizations outside of agriculture and 5 with-
in. As for its rules of conduct, the General assembly convenes upon the presence of at least two thirds of 
members and decides by consensus. Failing that, a majority of votes is needed, and the President prevails 
in case of a draw. With regards to the resources assigned to the Council, the decree foresees a detailed 
structure comprising a secretariat and units dedicated to administrative and financial affairs, debates, doc-
umentation and informatics, legislation and studies. The financial aspects are also regulated by decree. 
The resources include budgetary allocations provided by the State, gifts, donations and legacies, revenue 
from sales of movable and immovable property, and so on. The expenses foresee allowances granted to 
the members of the council, as well as other operating costs.
Seen through the lens of this brief’s theoretical framework, the CNDS appears to be a textbook example of 
how to construct a balanced and effective NSDI. Yet, its de facto effectiveness will have to be assessed once 
the interactions between social dialogue within the CNDS and policymaking begin.  
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Conclusion
The paper has explored some of the issues related to the effectiveness of NSDIs in presenting meaningful 
policy input that influences the ensuing output through the policymaking process (so, restricted to their 
‘output legitimacy’). It individuated three mutually-reinforcing dimensions that guarantee the operability of 
an NSDI: an enabling external environment (where there is support by policy makers, mutual trust between 
the social partners as well as the perception that NSDI actions are rapid and relevant), an encompassing 
mandate (consisting of issues under the remit of an NSDI and an ‘effective’ capacity to act on them), and its 
problem-solving capacity (that is exerted when a balance of power of the tripartite actors is underpinned 
by sufficient resources).
Each of the dimensions has been analysed both through a quantitative survey of NSDIs and individual case-
study analysis. There is substantial evidence that two sub-dimensions are key for effective social dialogue: 
having political support and having an ‘effective mandate’ as opposed to just a formal remit to deal with 
socioeconomic issues of interest. As part of an enabling environment, issues of mutual trust between the 
social partners and the NSDIs perceived rapidity and incisiveness are also of crucial importance, but they 
are intricately linked to political support. In fact, the government has the option – or better the duty – to 
intervene by facilitating the resolution of disputes or by updating the structure/operation of an NSDI with 
exactly the aim of supporting social dialogue.  
As for the problem-solving capacity of an NSDI, this dimension’s impact is not entirely clear-cut. With re-
gards to the endowment with resources, it depends on the precise tasks attributed to the NSDI. If it deals 
directly with high-level policy research, they are indispensable. If it provides a forum for the social partners 
to convene in, less so. With regards, instead to the balance of power of the social partners, the paper must 
rely only on anecdotal evidence, as none of the indicators in the survey measured this precisely. Certainly, 
the composition of the NSDI that should not favour any particular group matters immensely, as policy input 
and output have to result from a correct balancing of the different interests at stake. The external weight 
of the individual social partners is also of utmost importance, but they are a precondition of having social 
dialogue at all, rather than of its policy effectiveness, or ‘output legitimacy’.
Being this an explorative paper, it raises several questions to be addressed by future research. In addition 
to exploring the sources of input and throughput legitimacy of the processes pertaining to this specific 
form of social dialogue, also the preconditions informing NSDIs’ output legitimacy require further unpack-
ing. Where do social dialogue institutions derive their mandate from? What are the best institutional set-
ups that guarantee inclusive policymaking? What determines an institution’s problem-solving capacity? 
The resources an NSDI can draw on to improve its proficiency in problem-solving vary enormously de-
pending on the context. A good case study may be the national minimum wage policy by NEDLAC in South 
Africa, which drew on a combination of information and consultation, public hearings, an interrogation of 
research findings and international practices by an Advisory Panel, and negotiations between the social 
partners on the policy as well as mechanisms for compliance and enforcement.
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Annex 
Annex 1 Survey questions (summary)
Q1: In the past few years, has your institution experienced any major restructuring (change in mandate, compo-
sition, structure, method of functioning, etc.)?
Q2: Does your institution have a strategic plan to enhance the role and impact of social dialogue in policy/law 
making in your country?
Q3: Which of the following thematic areas in the world of work are priorities for your institution?
Q4: Has your institution discussed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs)?
Q4 bis: If yes, what were the outcomes of the discussions? 
Q4 ter: If no, what is the reason?
Q5: Over the last few years, how would you assess the participation of workers’ and employers’ organizations in 
the work of your institution?
Q5 bis: What does the participation of workers’ organizations entail?
Q5 ter: What does the participation of employers’ organizations entail? 
Q6: Over the last few years, has social dialogue been challenged in your country?
Q6 bis: If yes, please assess the actions taken to address these challenges?
Q6 ter: Please assess the actions taken to address these challenges.
Q8: What are the main labour-related challenges facing society?
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Q7: What are the internal challenges that are hindering the functioning of your institution?
Q9: Is your institution mandated and/or involved in developing action plans to manage changes in the world of 
work caused by factors such as, among others, technology, globalization, demography, climate change or work-
life balance?
Q9 bis: If yes, please indicate the level of involvement by your institution. 
Q9 ter: Please indicate the outcome of this involvement.
Q10: In the context of climate change, jobs will be created (i.e. green jobs), substituted and eliminated. What steps 
has your institution taken to help your members/constituents?
Q11: The implementation of new technologies, such as crowdwork platforms (e.g. Uber, Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
AirBnB), is having an impact on industrial relations, employment relationship, working conditions, businesses and 
employment. What steps has your institution taken to help your members/constituents?
Q12: Demographic changes, ageing populations, entrance of young generations to the labour markets and in-
crease in female labour market participation, will require responses that provide care services to the elderly, new 
jobs for youth and accompanying measures for workers with family responsibilities. What steps has your institu-
tion taken to help your members/constituents?
Q13: Changing values and aspirations in today’s globalized economy has implications for the world of work, es-
pecially in terms of work-life balance (family responsibilities, maternity/paternity leave, etc.), equality, well-being, 
evolving gender roles, etc. At the same time, needs and expectations of enterprises toward their employees are 
also transforming greatly (e.g. increased mobility and productivity). What steps has your institution taken to help 
your members/constituents?
Q14: What are the major transformational changes that are shaping social dialogue in your country?
Q15: What does your institution see as possible solutions for improved social dialogue in the future? 
Q16: What role should the ESC-SIs play in strengthening social dialogue, renewing the social contract and shap-
ing the future of work?
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Q17: What changes would you envisage your institution to undergo in order to remain relevant in the evolving 
context of work (e.g. in terms of agenda, missions, composition, participation, etc.)?
Q18: What steps can ESC-SI workers’ and employers’ member organizations take in order to increase their role 
and influence in policymaking?
Q19: What kind of input or support would your ESC-SI expect from AICESIS in this area?
Q20: How can ILO further support ESC-SIs to promote social dialogue in the context of the future of work in your 
country?
Q21: Please fill in below any additional comments.
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Annex 2 List of respondents
Region No. of re-
sponses
ESC-SIs
Africa 9 
(20.0%)
Conseil national économique et social (Algeria) 
Haut Conseil du Dialogue Social (Burkina Faso)
Comité National de Dialogue Social (Burundi)
Comité National du Dialogue Social (Chad)
Conseil Economique et Social (Guinea)
Conseil Economique Social Environnemental et Culturel (Côte d’Ivoire)
Conseil Economique Social et Environnemental (Morocco) 
Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental (Senegal) 
Groupe de Travail Tripartite du Contrat Social (Tunisia)
Americas 
and the 
Caribbean
5 
(11.1%)
Superior Labor Council of Chile
Ministry of Labour of Colombia
Consejo Superior de Trabajo (Costa Rica)
Consejo Economico y Social (Dominican Republic)
Ministry of Labour of Grenada
Arab States 2 
(4.4%)
Jordan Economic and Social Council 
Economic and Social Council of the Occupied Palestinian Territories
Asia-Pacific 10 
(22.2%)
Ready Made Garment – Tripartite Consultation Committee (Bangladesh) 
Cook Islands National Tripartite Labour Advisory Council 
China Economic and Social Council 
Ministry of Manpower of Indonesia 
The Labour Policy Council of Japan 
Economic and Social Development Commission of Korea 
Samoa National Tripartite Forum 
Ministry of Manpower of Singapore (in collaboration with the social partners) 
Ministry of Labour, Trade Union Relations and Sabaragamuwa Development of Sri Lanka
Tripartite Labour Advisory Council of Vanuatu
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Europe 19 
(42.2%)
Public Council of Armenia
Conseil National du Travail (Belgium)
Consejo Económico y Social de España 
Conseil économique social et environnemental (France)
Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia (on Tripartite Social Partnership 
Commission) 
Economic and Social Council of Greece 
Consiglio Nazionale dell'Economia e del Lavoro (Italy) 
Conseil économique et social (Luxembourg) 
Malta Council for Economic and Social Development 
Social Council of Montenegro 
Sociaal Economische Raad (the Netherlands)
Economic and Social Council of North Macedonia
Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
Social Dialogue Council of Poland 
Economic and Social Council of Romania 
Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation 
Social and Economic Council of Republic of Serbia 
Economic and Social Council of the Republika Srpska (part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)) 
National Tripartite Social and Economic Council (Ukraine)
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